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I. Introduction 
 
This essay is a sci-fi thought experiment about the significance of 
personhood in income taxation, meant to explore the validity of 
currently prevailing justifications for the tax. Assume that the year is 
2050. Developers, human or otherwise,1 have created non-sentient 
artificial intelligences (AIs) capable of transacting in digital currency. 
Assume, perhaps improbably, that some of these AIs are “feral.” A 
non-sentient AI might be feral in the future because it was never the 
property of a human, because it was abandoned by a human, or 
because it “escaped” into the wild. Imagine that non-sentient feral AIs 
create new value in the economy by doing things like writing, 
designing, securities and currency trading, planning, and 3D printing. 
They monetize that new economic value as active participants in the 
economy who sell goods or services to consumers. Intuition suggests 
that the value newly created by these independent economic actors 
should be included in the tax base and, in particular, the income tax 
base. Under current law, it is not.  
 
The federal income tax law, and the theories that underpin it, have yet 
to fully address the status of non-human earners. Scholarship on AI 
and taxation primarily has focused on the taxation of AI’s owners, on 
whether AI itself should be taxed despite being owned by someone 
else, or on the philosophical question of taxing sentient AI.2 But 
 
 
 
 
1 The first patent applications for AI-made inventions were filed recently by an international 
team of researchers. See Lara Butler, World first patent applications filed for inventions 
generated solely by artificial intelligence (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.surrey.ac.uk/news/wo 
rld-first-patent-applications-filed-inventions-generated-solely-artificial-intelligence. 
2 See generally XAVIER OBERSON, TAXING ROBOTS: HELPING THE ECONOMY TO ADAPT TO THE 
USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2019) (examining how current tax regimes would apply to 
robots owned by persons and considering whether robots could be granted legal personhood); 
Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP L. REV. 277 (2019) (proposing rebalance of the tax 
burdens on labor and capital to adjust for potential decline in labor as a result of automation); 
Ryan Abbott & Brett Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of 
Automation, 12 HARVARD L. & PUB. POLICY 145 (2018) (proposing countervailing tax 
measures such as disallowance of corporate tax deductions and introduction of an automation 
tax to remove tax incentives for automation of labor); Filipe Maia Alexandere, The Legal 
Status of Artificially Intelligent Robots: Personhood, Taxation and Control, 33 – 39 (June 1, 
2017), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985466 (discussing tax proposals to mitigate the effect 
of automation of labor); Joachim Englisch, Digitalisation and the Future of National Tax 
Systems: Taxing Robots? (Sept. 5, 2018), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3244670 (arguing 
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thinking about tax in the context of non-sentient feral AI allows us to 
identify the human elements and biases inherent in theoretical 
justifications of the income tax. Identifying those elements allows us 
to consider whether they are features or bugs. Specifically, this essay 
uses non-sentient feral AI as a vehicle to explore the application of two 
popular theoretical justifications for the income tax—the benefit 
principle and welfarist theories—and it concludes that a third, the 
ability to pay, is a better answer. The goal of this essay is not to 
suggest that feral AI should be subject to the income tax. Rather, it 
asks whether re-examining popular refrains in the tax policy canon 
within the context of feral AI will reveal anything about the human-
centricity of those ideas and their application to humans.  
 
Part II of the essay describes the current state of the law by walking 
through a series of hypotheticals involving machine earners, exploring 
the likely federal income tax consequences of each, to build a 
pragmatic (yet hypothetical) case for the inclusion of feral AI’s 
earnings in the tax base. Part III of the essay addresses the objection 
that income taxes would not be necessary in the context of feral AI by 
exploring the application of natural resources or sales taxes to 
transactions between humans and non-sentient feral AI. It concludes 
that natural resource taxes and sales taxes would be inadequate 
substitutes for an income tax because they would leave AI undertaxed 
relative to its human counterparts in the income tax base. Part IV of 
the essay then asks whether income taxation of non-sentient feral AI’s 
earnings would be supported by either the benefit principle or welfarist 
theories. Because those conceptions of taxation rely so heavily on 
human preferences, they are ill-fitting in the case of non-sentient AI. 
By analogy, they are also ill-fitting in cases when human preferences 
are weak, such as disposition of the last-earned dollars of the ultra-
wealthy, or when human preferences are delegitimized by the 
government, such as those of marginalized groups like undocumented 
immigrants. Adopting a non-human point of view in tax policy, then, 
can inform our thinking about taxation outside of what humans 
perceive to be the norm. 
 
that proposals to tax robots are premature. But taxation of the use of robots might slow 
disruption in the labor market). 
160 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.1 
 
 
II. Income Tax Law is Human-centric 
 
Income tax law is, naturally, human-centric. It assumes that income is 
earned by people. An AI is not a person.3 Without a “person” in the 
mix, earnings are not “income” under the Internal Revenue Code, and 
they are not subject to income taxation.4 For tax purposes, a “person” 
is either a human individual or an entity that is owned directly or 
indirectly by human individuals.5 A non-person, such as an AI or an 
animal with earnings potential, is excluded from income taxation, even 
when that non-person is not the property of an actual person. This 
essay explores why prevailing justifications for the income tax either 
support the exclusion the income of non-persons from the tax base or 
fail to consider it. The essay also will suggest that examining the gaps 
in tax policy surrounding non-persons can be instructive with regard 
the application of policy to persons.  
 
To demonstrate the existing gap in tax policy with regard to non-
owned non-persons like feral AI, the following paragraphs walk 
through three hypotheticals involving income earned by machines. In 
each case, current law dictates that the machine is not a taxpayer. In 
the first two examples, income earned by the machine instead accrues 
to whomever eventually exerts dominion and control over it. A final 
example discusses a hypothetical non-sentient feral AI not subject to 
capture by a person as a means of examining the roles of personhood 
and property rights in the current income tax regime. The section 
concludes that a combination of lack of property rights and lack of 
personhood creates a bar to currently including income of a non-
human earner in the tax base. This section’s discussion of current law 
serves as a prelude to Section III, which discusses how prevailing 
justifications of income taxation might apply in the case of non-owned 
non-persons like feral AI. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 As explained below, AI is excluded from the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of person.  
Although proposals have been forwarded by some European politicians to grant legal 
personhood to robots, none have succeeded. See OBERSON, supra note 2, at 131. 
4 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (2019) (income tax imposed on individuals); I.R.C. § 11 (2019) (income 
tax imposed on corporations); I.R.C. § 641 (2019) (income tax imposed on trusts and estates). 
5 I.R.C. §7701(a)(1) (2019). 
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a. Example 1 
 
Here is the first example. Imagine an artist who creates a non-sentient 
robot that rolls along the sidewalk collecting lost coins. The artist, for 
the purpose of performance art, abandons the robot. Ownerless, it 
wanders around picking up pennies, nickels, dimes, and quarters. If it 
were a person, it would be taxed on the money it collected. The loose 
change would be a treasure trove.6 The robot would have “an 
undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the 
taxpayer has complete dominion,” which is the commonly accepted 
definition of income subject to taxation under federal law.7 But the 
robot is not a person. Should it be taxed on its income? The 
conventional answer is no. It is nothing more than abandoned property, 
and it has no property rights in anything that it possesses. The robot 
itself, either empty or full of coins, is a treasure trove to be included in 
the income of the person that eventually exerts dominion over it.8 
 
b. Example 2 
 
Consider a second example. Imagine that the artist creates a second 
non-sentient robot. This new robot rolls along the sidewalk collecting 
discarded objects, which it uses to make found-object art. Again, the 
artist abandons the robot. Now imagine that the robot is a mobile 
vending machine. It can accept money in exchange for art. This 
scenario is slightly different from the first. Unlike the first robot, the 
second robot uses labor to take something from the commons and 
create new economic value where none existed before.9 Also unlike 
the first robot, the second robot engages in exchanges for value. It both 
expands the economy and has realization events that would trigger 
taxation for a person. But the robot is not a person. Should the second 
robot be taxed on its income? Again, the conventional answer is no, 
 
 
 
 
6 Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 7 - 8 (1969) (found property or money is a 
“treasure trove” taxable to the finder whose possession is undisputed). 
7 Charley v. C.I.R., 91 F.3d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1996). 
8 Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 7 – 8. 
9 John Locke might have advocated for property rights on this basis had the actor had been 
human. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1980)(1690). 
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for all of the reasons given above.10 This second scenario is more 
interesting, though, because the robot has taken on some 
characteristics that traditionally are associated with taxpayers. It is 
generative, and, until someone seizes it, it exerts control over the value 
it generates. The problem remains, though, that like the first robot, the 
second robot is abandoned property and will be a treasure trove 
taxable to the person that eventually exerts dominion over it.11  
 
c. Example 3 
 
Here is a third and final example, from which the rest of the essay 
proceeds. In it, the artist creates a “robot” that is in the digital world 
rather than in the purely physical one. Imagine that the artist creates a 
non-sentient AI and releases it into the digital world, abandoning any 
means of reclaiming it. Assume that, like the second robot, the AI 
creates value in the economy and engages in exchanges. For instance, 
it may generate written content, trade digital goods, or make art. Also 
assume that the AI uses cryptocurrency. Finally, assume that exerting 
dominion over the AI would be difficult or impossible.12 Should the AI 
be taxed on its income, ignoring for the moment the practical 
impossibility of doing so?13  
 
 
 
 
10 Although notice that a VAT could easily apply in this context. See OBERSON, supra note 2, 
at 87 – 110 (suggesting ways in which a value added tax might apply to AI or robots). 
11 Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 7 – 8. 
12 Cryptocurrencies are able to evade government regulation due to the use of blockchain 
technology that makes transactions with such currencies nearly impossible to track. To 
illustrate this point, Canadian entrepreneur and founder of Quadriga, Canada’s largest 
cryptocurrency exchange, died early in 2019, leaving behind $145 million dollars in Bitcoin 
and other cryptocurrency assets that are currently inaccessible to the cryptocurrency’s 
investors. Daniel Shane, A crypto exchange may have lost $145 million after its CEO suddenly 
died, CNN Business (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/05/tech/quadriga-gerald-
cotten-cryptocurrency/index.html. The founder’s widow, Jennifer Robertson, said that the 
laptop used by her late husband to run the currency exchange is encrypted, and she does not 
know the password or recovery key. Id. 
13 Note that absent some extraordinary programming, if a government were able to enforce 
collections against the AI, it is likely that a person could exert dominion over the AI, which 
would bring our analysis back to treasure trove. Because this essay is a though experiment 
meant to ask what the impossible can teach us about the possible, let’s set the question of 
collections aside. 
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Whether feral AI should owe income tax on its digital earnings is not 
easily resolved.14 The usual “no” argument remains that property 
cannot own property, cannot have wealth, and therefore cannot have 
an accession to wealth. Technically, then, it fails to meet the federal 
definition of income. On the other hand, ownership is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for becoming a taxpayer. For 
instance, embezzled funds are treated as income to the embezzler, even 
though someone else owns them.15 Assigned income is treated as 
income of the assignor even if it legally is property of the assignee.16 
Partnerships are not taxpayers even though they legally own income 
that they earn; rather, the income is reported by the partners.17 
Transfers of payments to AI are conceptually no different from other 
transfers. The determination of the appropriate taxpayer for AI-
counterparty transactions should hinge on who has dominion and 
control over the transferred property—so, the AI. Or, because feral AI 
has no legal right to interact with a counterparty, perhaps such 
transfers are analogous to abandonment by the human counterparty 
followed by dominion asserted by the AI. Regardless, reliance on AI’s 
lack of legally-enforceable property rights provides an insufficient 
justification for non-taxation. The income tax law is more concerned 
with substantive dominion and control than it is with formal property 
rights.  
 
The prior paragraph established that lack of property rights should not 
be a bar to taxing non-sentient feral AI, but what about the AI’s lack of 
personhood? Under current law, non-sentient feral AI is not a person 
for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 7701 provides that 
“[t]he term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an 
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or 
corporation.”18 AI, absent human intervention, is not a trust, estate, 
 
 
 
 
14 Notice that the question is not whether feral AI could be taxed. If we infer that it could be 
taxed, its assets would be seizable, and if its assets are seizable, it is nothing more than a 
treasure trove. 
15 See James v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 1052, 1055 (1961) (illegal gains included in gross 
income). 
16 See Lucas v. Earl, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930) (earnings must be taxed to the earner even if a third 
party has a legal right to them once they are earned). 
17 I.R.C. § 701 (2019). 
18 I.R.C. §7701(a)(1) (2019). 
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partnership, association, company, or corporation (although if not feral 
it could be owned by one of those). Consequently, for feral AI to be 
subject to tax under current law, it must be an “individual.” 
 
Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on individuals.19 
Although the word “individual” appears with regularity in the Code, it 
is not defined. The presumption seems to be that an individual is a 
human person. Instances where the word “individual” includes non-
humans are specifically noted, and none of those instances (of course) 
refers to AI.20 By contrast, “individuals” in the Code do lots of things 
that currently only humans do, like get married,21 buy a home,22 have 
children,23 go to jail,24 and retire.25 It seems unlikely that non-sentient 
feral AI would be an “individual” for purposes of the current income 
tax, since it neither engages in typical human activities nor is an entity 
statutorily designated as an individual.  
 
In conclusion, under current federal income tax law, non-sentient feral 
AI is not a proper object of taxation because it is neither an individual 
nor a legal person. But why is personhood relevant to the inclusion of 
income in the tax base? Personhood connotes the right of ownership, 
but as noted earlier, ownership is not required for income taxation. Is 
personhood merely a signal for other, more normatively relevant 
characteristics, like the ability to create new economic value, remove 
and segregate value from the economy, and engage independently in 
economic exchange? The hypothetical above assumed that non-
sentient feral AI would be capable of those things. If so, by analogy, 
 
 
 
 
19 I.R.C. § 1 (2019). In addition, section 11 imposes income tax on corporations, but our 
hypothetical AI is not a corporation. 
20 For example, see I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (2019) (“For purposes of this paragraph, an 
organization described in section 401(a), 501(c)(17), or 509(a) or a portion of a trust 
permanently set aside or to be used exclusively for the purposes described in section 642(c) or 
a corresponding provision of a prior income tax law shall be considered an individual”) and § 
165(l)(2) (2019) (defining “qualified individual” as including related persons under IRC § 
267(b), which includes corporations).  
21 I.R.C. § 7703 (2019). 
22 I.R.C. § 36 (2019).  
23 I.R.C. § 151 (2019). 
24 I.R.C. § 139F (2019). 
25 I.R.C. § 408 (2019). 
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the hypothetical AI should be taxed whether or not it has legal 
personhood.  
 
From a position of pragmatism, new value in the economy should be 
included in the tax base, even when the value is created by a non-
owned, non-human actor like a feral AI. It is not obvious, however, 
that income taxation is the appropriate mechanism for inclusion. This 
essay focuses on income taxes, but sales taxes or taxes on the 
extraction of natural resources are other potential ways of including 
newly added value in the tax base. The next section discusses those tax 
regimes and concludes that for non-sentient feral AI, natural resource 
taxes are an uneasy fit and that the application of sales or value-added 
taxes does not preclude the use of an income tax. 
 
III. Natural Resource Taxes, Sales Taxes, and Feral AI 
 
In both the federal and state systems, the income tax is joined by a 
variety of other taxes, including sales taxes and natural resources 
taxes. Although they are not relevant to this essay’s exploration of 
benefit and welfarist theories of taxation below, I include them as a 
means of highlighting the importance of the income tax as a driver of 
distribution of the tax burden.  
 
a. Sales Taxes 
 
An objection to exploring income tax theories in the context of non-
sentient feral AI may be that other taxes, such as natural resource or 
sales taxes, will suffice, so that the income tax may be reserved for 
people without compromising the integrity of the tax base. Although 
the goal of this essay is not to champion the taxation of feral AI, but 
rather is to explore what an AI-centered thought experiment can teach 
us about tax policy as it relates to humans, this section addresses the 
objection that income tax would not be needed in the case of non-
sentient feral AI. 
 
One method of taxing feral AI may be to subject its transactions to 
sales tax. Sales taxes typically are charged against the sales of goods 
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and services to end consumers.26 Although there is no federal sales tax 
yet, they are commonly levied by the states.27 The tax typically takes 
one of three forms.28 A consumer levy is charged against customers 
but is collected by the seller, and it is the most common form of sales 
tax.29 A privilege tax falls upon the seller for the privilege of doing 
business in the state, but the incidence of this tax probably is shifted to 
the customer through pricing.30 Finally, a transaction tax is charged 
against the transaction itself, with liability for payment falling on the 
customer and liability for collection falling on the seller.31 In the case 
of feral AI, it is tempting to think that sales taxes in any of these forms 
might be sufficient to reach earnings. A sales tax is particularly 
attractive because, unlike the income tax, it does not turn on the AI’s 
personhood or property rights. Instead, it is triggered by a 
transaction.32  
 
A handful of problems prevent sales taxes from effectively reaching 
the hypothetical earnings of our imaginary AI. First, consumers are 
liable for sales taxes in most jurisdictions. Non-sentient feral AI would 
be a seller rather than a consumer, so a sales tax would leave the 
earnings of the AI unaffected in consumer-based jurisdictions.33 In 
other words, even if transactions with the AI were subject to sales 
taxes, feral AI would remain undertaxed in comparison to human or 
corporate merchants in consumer levy states and transaction tax states 
first because the AI would never be a consumer and second because 
other merchants would be subject to both sales and income taxes. This 
would be true even if consumer levy states and transaction tax states 
enacted a privilege tax specifically on feral AI. Doing so would create 
parity for purposes of the sales tax but not the income tax. It also 
would be true in privilege tax states themselves, because once again 
the AI would not be liable for income taxes that other sellers must pay. 
A second reason why sales tax on AI counterparty transactions is an 
 
 
 
 
26 1 BENDER’S STATE TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE § 12.01 (2019). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.   
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. This assumes that the AI’s pricing is inelastic.   
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insufficient stand-in for the income tax is that although the consumer 
is nominally liable for sales taxes in most states, the merchant is the 
designated collection agent for the tax.34 Feral AI may not have been 
programmed to collect and remit sales taxes and, even if it were (since 
we are dealing in fictions already), it likely would not be able to 
respond adequately to changes in the law. Third, there is no federal 
sales tax, so absent a sea change in federal tax policy, the federal 
government could not use sales taxes to reach feral AI even if the 
incidence of tax were not in question. 
 
Sales taxes seemingly are not a good solution to the income tax 
problem.35 Even if sales taxes applied, this essay’s primary inquiry– 
the question of philosophical support for an income tax on non-
sentient feral AI— would remain unanswered. 
 
b. Natural Resources Taxes 
 
If feral AI is not a person for tax purposes, could it be a natural 
resource? Or could we view the data that it uses as a natural resource 
and its human customers as extractors? 
 
Feral AI, like a feral animal, could conceivably be categorized as a 
resource.36 If captured, it would be a treasure trove to the person who 
exerts dominion over it,37 or perhaps capturing it would result in 
untaxed imputed income, like fish to a fisherman or a feral hog to a 
hunter. And if a person could assert dominion over feral AI, found 
property and captured animals would be apt analogies. For purposes of 
philosophical exploration, though, let us continue to hypothesize that it 
would be difficult or impossible to subject feral AI to the dominion of 
a person. Also recall that unlike feral animals who produce additional 
economic value (for instance, by giving birth to other feral animals of 
 
 
 
 
34 This is true regardless of the form that the tax takes. Id. 
35 Cf. OBERSON, supra note 2, at 87 – 110 (suggesting ways in which a value added tax might 
apply to AI or robots). 
36 Many thanks to the annual conference of Mid-Career Tax Professors, and especially 
Miranda Perry, for a completely entertaining discussion of this idea. Notes on file with author. 
37 Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. 3 at 7 - 8 (found property or money is a “treasure trove” taxable to 
the finder whose possession is undisputed). 
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value), our hypothetical feral AI is capable of monetizing its newly 
created value by engaging in transactions with people.38 Consequently, 
for purposes of this essay, it makes little sense to treat feral AI like a 
feral animal.39  
 
Even if non-sentient feral AI differs meaningfully from a feral animal 
under the constraints of our hypothetical, the natural resource analogy 
still may apply to its customers. Perhaps a customer of AI in the digital 
world would be analogous to a miners who extract resources from the 
physical one. Instead of drilling for oil or mining for coal, AI would 
mine data.  
 
In the physical world, resource extraction may be subject to severance 
taxes. Currently, thirty four states levy severance taxes on the 
extraction of intrastate natural resources.40 For example, in Alaska, a 
severance tax is levied on the producer of oil or natural gas.41 For oil, 
the tax is levied at “five percent of the gross value at the point of 
production of the oil,” while for natural gas, the tax is levied at “1.667 
percent of the gross value at the point of production of the gas.”42 
Likewise, in Montana, a severance tax is levied on coal mined within 
the state.43 Under Article IX, §5 of the Montana state constitution, the 
legislature is directed to contribute at least half of the coal severance 
 
 
 
 
38 Cf Inventor Trains Crows to Find Money, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.ph 
p?storyId=87878028 (March 4, 2008) (scientist trained crows to collect coins and exchange 
them for food). Consider an example suggested to at the Association of Mid-Career Tax 
Professors in 2019 by Michael Simkovic: a homeowner with a mouse problem leaves food out 
for a feral cat. In exchange, the cat enters the home and kills mice. Does the cat have income 
equal to the market value of the food that it consumes? Does the homeowner have income 
equal to the market value of the extermination of the mice? See Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 
60 (recipients of goods or services in barter transactions have gross income equal to the value 
of what they received).  
39 I hope to relax this essay’s assumptions and develop the feral animal comparison more 
thoroughly in future work on the taxation of real, rather than hypothetical, AI. 
40 The State of State (and Local) Tax Policy, Tax Policy Center, Urban Center and Brookings 
Institute, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-state-and-local-severance-
taxes-work (last visited on August 30, 2019). 
41 Oil and gas production tax, Alaska Stat. Ann. § 43.55.011(e) (West 2019). 
42 Id. 
43 It is also important to note that Montana is also the state in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the intrastate collection of a severance tax was ruled to be constitutional, because 
such a tax does not interfere with the Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause. 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
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tax collected to a trust fund, and “the principle of the trust shall remain 
inviolate unless appropriated by vote of three-fourths (3/4) of the 
members of each house of the legislature.”44 Through the trust fund, 
Montana issues bonds used to finance infrastructure projects and 
“renewable resource projects in the state to provide [...] a healthy 
economy, alleviation social and economic impacts created by coal 
development, and a clean and healthful environment for future 
generations.”45 Many other states have severances taxes as well.46  
 
The comparison of transactions with non-sentient feral AI to natural 
resource extraction is attractive but not complete. On one hand, AI is 
similar to equipment used in mining. In fact, it literally may be mining 
data. And perhaps data is similar to a natural resource because much of 
it exists in a public commons. To the extent that an economic actor 
profits from extraction of this common resource, it may be equitable to 
exact a fee for the benefit of those who have an interest in the 
commons, just as Alaska and Montana do. On the other hand, this 
argument would apply not only to feral AI but also to AI that is owned 
by a taxpayer. In addition, extraction taxes typically apply to the 
extractor who, in this analogy, would be the user of AI rather than the 
AI itself. So like a consumer or transaction-based sales tax, an 
extraction tax on feral AI would not reach the earnings of the AI, but 
rather would increase the cost of the transaction to the user, assuming 
that the AI’s pricing is inelastic. As with sales taxes, the AI would be 
relatively undertaxed in comparison to market actors who are persons 
subject to income taxes. Finally, unlike coal or helium or natural gas, 
data in a commons are usually non-rivalrous. While many natural 
resource taxes have as a goal the restoration of value to a jurisdiction’s 
 
 
 
 
44 Mont. Const. art. IX, § 5.  
45 Mont. Code Ann. § 17-5-701 (West 2019). 
46 A few additional examples follow. In Michigan, a severance tax is levied on oil or gas.  
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 205.301 (West 2019). In North Dakota, a severance tax is levied on 
“all coal severed for sale or industrial purposes by coal mines within the state” at $37.50 per 
ton of 2,000 pounds. N.D. Cent. Code § 57-61-01 (2019). According to the statute, the tax is 
“in lieu of any sales or use taxes imposed by law,” and “[e]ach coal mine owner or operator 
shall remit the tax for each month, within twenty-five days after the end of each month, to the 
tax commissioner on reports and forms as the tax commissioner deems necessary.” Id. In West 
Virginia, an annual minimum severance tax of $0.50 is imposed per ton on the “severing, 
extracting, reducing to possession or producing coal for sale, profit or commercial use.”  
W.Va. Code, § 11-12B-3 (2019). Other examples can be found in state statutory compilations. 
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residents in light of depletion, the same reasoning likely would not 
apply to feral AI’s use of data (although a compensatory justification 
would remain).    
 
In summary, while sales taxes or extraction taxes on non-sentient feral 
AI may raise funds by increasing the cost to the AI’s users, they would 
leave the AI’s earnings untouched. As a result, the question of an 
income tax remains relevant.  
 
The next section discusses whether currently prevailing theoretical 
justifications for the income tax undergird or work against the 
pragmatic case for taxing feral AI. Where gaps in the tax policy exist 
as it applies to non-sentient feral AI, the essay questions whether a 
human-centric view of tax policy hinders the development of tax 
policy not only in the sci-fi world but also in the real one beyond. 
 
IV. Prevailing Theoretical Justifications for the Income Tax Are 
Human-Centric 
 
A pragmatic case for taxing non-sentient feral AI is that, in the 
hypothetical above, it creates economic value that is excluded from the 
income tax base. By taking pre-existing information and adding value, 
AI increases the overall size of the economic pie without sharing a 
slice. Other creators of value—people and assets—are covered by 
provisions for the taxation of ordinary income and capital gains, but 
none of these provisions in their current iterations would cover feral 
AI. If, in the third hypothetical above, we ignore the AI because it is 
neither a person nor an asset owned by a person, newly created 
economic value will fall permanently outside of the tax base. As a 
practical matter, the AI’s gains are analogous to the income of a 
person, and governments should want to capture some of this new 
value through income taxation. At the same time, many existing 
theoretical justifications of the income tax are person-centric, and AI is 
not a person (yet). The following paragraphs discuss two of those 
justifications, the benefit principle and generalized welfarist theories, 
as a way of exploring human-centric elements of the philosophy 
behind income taxation. Specifically, the satisfaction of human 
subjective preferences looms large in both the benefit principle and 
2020] HOFFER 171 
 
 
welfarist theories, and it creates distortion in cases when humans have 
no preferences, are unable to express them, or have preferences that 
are either disregarded or non-cognizable by the government. 
 
a. The Benefit Principle of Taxation 
 
The benefit principle of taxation holds that people should bear the cost 
of government in proportion to the benefits that they receive from it.47 
In its simplest form, a benefit-based tax would be the equivalent of a 
user fee for something like postage or utilities, levied on the basis of a 
taxpayer’s revealed preferences for and use of government-provided 
goods and services.48 Traditionally, the idea’s proponents posited that 
the “since social contract required the government to perform various 
tasks (such as protecting life or property), and individuals were 
obliged to fund those services, the extent that individuals benefited 
from those contracted services determined their liability to tax.”49 In 
other words, taxpayers would have a preference for the level of public 
goods provided by a government, would reveal that preference, and 
would pay accordingly.50  
 
The benefit principle is problematic when applied to non-market goods 
such as the protection of rights, which are difficult to value, or when 
applied across a large number of people where not everyone reveals or 
receives his or her preferred level of public goods.51 Modern 
scholarship has attempted to resolve these issues by using a taxpayer’s 
income as a proxy for the benefit that the taxpayer derives from 
government, since government protection and infrastructure are 
required to create and preserve income.52 If income is an adequate 
 
 
 
 
47 JOSEPH J. CORDES ET AL., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2005); 
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 62 (4th ed. 2008).  
48 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 47, at 62. 
49 Graeme S. Cooper, The Benefit Theory of Taxation, 11 AUSTRL. TAX F. 397, 432 (1994). 
50 Id. at 448. See also RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE, A STUDY IN 
PUBLIC ECONOMY 69 (1959) (“Taxation according to benefits received was to be formulated 
by determining tax shares according to subjective evaluation of public services.”). 
51 Id. at 452; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 47, at 62-63. 
52 Cooper, supra note 49, at 484, SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 47, at 63.  
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proxy for benefit, the benefit principle may be used to justify 
progressive income taxation.53  
 
In the context of income earned by feral AI, the benefit principle is 
less cogent, and examining it in that context brings to light built-in 
human assumptions and biases. As discussed above, satisfaction of 
preferences is central to the benefit principle, and preferences, as they 
are conceived of in political theory, are inherently subjective. For 
instance, Richard Musgrave wrote in 1959 that the benefit principle 
“has the great merit of tying the choice of public services to the 
preferences of individual members of the community.”54 Other 
scholars have noted that the benefit principle might “lead taxpayers to 
make better-informed decisions about the size and scope of 
government,”55 since “[y]ou certainly can’t just ask people what 
government activities like national defense are worth to them.”56 These 
comments and others like them demonstrate a focus on what taxpayers 
want, and they assume that the taxpayers in question can express at 
least some approval or disapproval through civic engagement.  
 
The benefit principle’s subjective focus on what people want makes 
little sense in the context of a hypothetical feral AI.57 Non-sentient AI 
is incapable of having preferences. It cannot “experience” benefit. It 
may, for example, accrue more or fewer assets as a result of 
environmental factors; but it is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied as a 
result. To say that AI benefits from the existence of markets or the 
internet anthropomorphizes AI based on human preferences about 
trade. Non-sentient AI, being nothing more than a set of algorithms, is 
incapable of forming preferences about the existence of markets or the 
internet, so it is not advantaged or disadvantaged by any government 
act affecting those things. It might function more or less efficiently in 
response to a government act, but because it is not self-aware, it does 
 
 
 
 
 
54 MUSGRAVE, supra note 50, at 62. 
55 See CORDES ET AL., supra note 47, at 24. 
56 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 47, at 62. 
57 This is not to criticize Professor Oberson’s conclusion that the benefit principle could apply 
in the context of AI owned by a person. See OBERSON, supra note 2, at 34. He notes that fees 
for supervision or registration of robots could fall under this umbrella but that they would not 
be a major contributor to tax revenue. Id. at 43. 
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not experience fluctuations in efficiency as beneficial or detrimental. 
To say that they are beneficial or detrimental because the AI engages 
in more or fewer transactions projects our own beliefs about worth 
onto an actor that is essentially just a mechanical process.  
 
That non-sentient feral AI is unable to experience benefit should, 
under the benefit principle, lead to the conclusion that income earned 
by it falls outside of the tax base. And yet, new value created by feral 
AI does not differ substantively from new value created by any other 
taxpayer. As a result, the benefit principle, at least in its subjective 
formulation, falls short as a stand-alone means of distributing the 
income taxation burden in this circumstance.  
 
The failure of the benefit principle in the case of feral AI highlights a 
very human failing of the idea itself. That subjective benefit is difficult 
to quantify has long been a shortcoming the benefit principle, 
particularly given the reach of the modern administrative state in daily 
life.58 But the failing is more fundamental than simply the difficulty of 
appraisal. The idea itself—that the government, along with the rights it 
provides and protects, can be assigned a dollar value—is jaundiced. 
This is particularly true for that iteration of the benefit principle that 
uses income as a proxy for benefit.  
 
 In any of its iterations, the benefit principle leaves open the question 
of how to appraise the provision and protection of more ephemeral 
rights like voting, free speech, the use of public spaces, and privacy. 
When income is employed to measure benefit, we are forced to assume 
that rights not related to income and property, or other hard-to-value 
benefits, like the psychic benefits of government, are shared either 
equally by all (and therefore don’t affect the distribution of tax burden) 
or are shared in proportion to income (and therefore are one of the 
drivers of distribution of the tax burden). To assume the former 
ignores political failings with regard to marginalized people or groups 
who may not have equal access to the rights and protections afforded 
to others by the government. To assume the latter suggests that the 
market value of a taxpayer’s labor or return to capital determines, for 
 
 
 
 
58 Id. at 62 – 63. 
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appraisal purposes, the value of that taxpayer’s rights to free speech, 
privacy, etc. If so, rights are inherently more valuable to high earners 
than to low earners. Such a view fails to afford equal dignity to 
taxpayers at the low end of the income spectrum, and it falls apart 
completely when one considers the juxtaposition of a human earner 
with non-sentient feral AI.  
 
Substituting a non-sentient feral AI for a marginalized taxpayer or a 
low income taxpayer in the analysis above draws into sharp focus the 
failure of the benefit principle to make allowances to taxpayers who 
either cannot express preferences about government or whose 
preferences about government are marginalized. Two examples 
demonstrate the problem of using income as a proxy for benefit in this 
regard. First, consider the juxtaposition of a low-earning human and a 
high-earning feral AI. Under a version of the benefit theory that 
employs income as a proxy for benefit, the AI will have higher income 
tax liability than the human because the AI is deemed to have 
benefitted more from the existence of the government. But the human 
has rights while the AI does not. A conclusion that the AI benefits 
more from government than the human discounts the value of those 
rights. After all, the AI cannot prize more highly than a human being 
rights that it does not possess. The message sent by the benefit 
principle here is that ephemeral rights have little or no real value. 
 
Dismissing income as a proxy for benefit and choosing subjective 
valuation instead produces a different undesirable result. Consider as a 
second example two market participants: one is a feral AI, and the 
other is a human being. Both earn $50,000 during the year writing 
advertising content. From a subjective standpoint, the AI values the 
existence of the government at $0, since it can neither have 
preferences nor experience the satisfaction of them. The human 
taxpayer, on the other hand, likely values the existence of government 
at more than $0. If the taxpayer’s subjective valuation of government 
benefits is used to determine tax liability, the human taxpayer will 
have greater liability than the AI. In sheer dollar terms, the result is 
inequitable. Both earners have created $50,000 of economic value, but 
their tax burden differs. A higher tax burden will put the human at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the AI. Thinking about AI in this 
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context highlights the ways in which human-centricity compromises 
the benefit principle as a foundation of tax policy.     
 
b. The Principle of Welfare Maximization 
 
Welfarist theories of taxation are another predominant strand of 
thinking that may be troubled in the context of non-sentient feral AI. 
They gauge distributive justice based on the social welfare or utility of 
people within a polity.59 To analyze a tax system through a welfarist 
lense, policy theorists first determine the social welfare or utility of 
individuals and then aggregate those individual amounts.60 A system 
that produces more aggregate utility or welfare is better than one that 
produces less. Optimal tax theory, a more robust version of this 
approach, balances both welfare and economic efficiency.61 Although 
there is no universally agreed-upon definition of either utility or social 
welfare, most models assume that greater satisfaction of individuals’ 
preferences equates to greater utility or welfare.62 In addition, most 
models consider individuals’ self-regarding welfare and do not account 
for “societal good defined non-individualistically.”63  
 
When determining whether preferences are satisfied, welfarists 
typically assume the declining marginal utility of income.64 Simply 
put, “declining marginal utility of income means that each dollar is 
worth less than the dollar before.”65 This assumption serves as a 
foundation for most of today’s theorization of progressive income 
 
 
 
 
59 See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987). 
60 Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 904, 911 (2011) (describing welfarist approaches to distributive justice). 
61 Banks et al.  
62 Bankman & Griffith, supra note 59, at 1248 – 49; Lawsky, supra note 60, at 912 (“Most 
economists and many law professors accept the preference-satisfaction definition of 
utility...”); see e.g., Thomas Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B. C. L. REV. 
1363 (2004) (using happiness as a proxy for social welfare). 
63 Lawsky, supra note 60, at 922. 
64 Peter Diamond & Emmanual Saez, The Case for Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to 
Policy Recommendations, 25 J. Econ. Perspectives 165, 168 – 169 (2011) (“A utilitarian social 
welfare criterion with marginal utility of consumption declining to zero [is] the most 
commonly used specification in optimal tax models . . . .”).  
65 Id. at 915. 
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taxation.66 Generally speaking, if taxpayers are expected to share the 
tax burden proportionately, a progressive rate structure is necessary to 
exact equal sacrifice because each additional dollar creates less 
welfare for its recipient than the last.67 If marginal utility approaches 
zero for the income of very high earners, a social welfare theory may 
counsel very high rates of taxation, depending upon the impact on 
efficiency losses if optimal tax theory is considered.68  
 
Applying welfarist income tax principles in the context of a non-
sentient earner such as AI is puzzling because the concept of declining 
marginal utility simply does not apply. Because it has no preferences, 
and because it does not experience its own existence, AI has no utility 
function, declining or otherwise, as we traditionally conceive of one. It 
derives no satisfaction of preferences from either the receipt of income 
or possession of assets. In addition, it experiences no disutility from 
loss of a revenue stream or dispossession of assets. Importantly, 
because it is nothing more than a set of algorithms, no amount of 
taxation would discourage it from continued production. A tax born by 
non-sentient feral AI therefore would create no efficiency loss, 
resulting in no optimal tax-based objection to a confiscatory rate. 
Because welfare-based theories of taxation are focused on individual 
self-regarding welfare, and because AI has no individual self-
regarding welfare or tax-responsiveness, a welfare theory of taxation 
based on a purely self-regarding assessment of welfare would counsel 
taxing the AI at a rate of 100%.  
 
 
 
 
 
66 Id. at 904 (“The assumption of declining marginal utility of income . . . . has been crucial in 
tax scholarship over the last sixty years or so . . . .”). 
67 See Martin J. McMahon & Alice Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 32 (1998) (“If the marginal utility of money 
declines as the amount of money increases, then proportional sacrifice requires progressive 
rather than proportional rates.”). 
68 See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1443 (2018) (noting 
that optimal tax literature seeks a desirable level of taxation “while minimizing adverse ex 
ante incentives,” and that recent work has rebutted “[a]n old view in the optimal tax literature 
held that the optimal tax on wealth and capital income is zero, in order to preserve neutrality to 
the decision whether to spend or to save over the long term.”); Diamond & Saez, supra note 
64, at 166 (on the basis of optimal tax analysis informed by empirical research, “very high 
earners should be subject to high and rising marginal tax rates on earnings.”); Bankman & 
Griffith, supra note 59, at 1918 (the case that progressive taxation reduces efficiency is 
overstated). 
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c. The Welfare Juxtaposition of Non-Sentient Feral AI 
and People 
 
If the income of non-sentient feral AI should be taxed confiscatorily 
because the AI has zero utility from its earnings, the same result 
should apply to any person who has zero utility for earnings, absent 
some distinguishing factor. In other words, if the hypothesis about the 
declining marginal utility of a dollar is true, non-sentient feral AI is 
analogous to any person who has a marginal utility of zero in 
additional dollars.69 People who theoretically have zero marginal 
utility for additional income may be individuals who have ultra-high 
income, those who participate in labor or capital markets for reasons 
other than earnings, or those whose wealth is so great that they are 
insensitive to fluctuation at the margins.70 As with non-sentient feral 
AI, welfarist theories would counsel taxing these individuals’ zero-
utility earnings at a very high rate— perhaps 100%. Such individuals 
have no preference for the receipt of additional income; therefore, their 
utility is not decreased nor is their behavior is affected by its loss.  
 
The welfarist justification for confiscatory taxation feels uneasy in the 
case of individuals who reach zero marginal utility though, in a way 
that it does not feel troubling in the case of non-sentient feral AI. If we 
chafe at the idea of a confiscatory tax on zero-utility earnings, it may 
reveal an underlying disbelief that marginal utility could ever reach 
zero. As Sarah Lawsky has noted, most legal scholarship “simply 
assumes” declining marginal utility “without seriously engaging the 
question,”71 and although “declining marginal utility of income is at 
least superficially consistent with intuition,” evidence exists that 
people’s utility functions may not be strictly declining.72 For instance, 
people may value additional dollars that propel them into the next 
 
 
 
 
69 See generally Lawsky, supra note 60, at 904 (questioning the validity of the assumption of 
declining marginal utility). 
70 In other words, above a certain level of asset holding, the limits of human cognition may not 
permit a granular understanding of an individual’s wealth. A person may understand that she 
is very, very, very wealthy, and the addition of a dollar does not change her understanding.  
The person knows that her wealth is extensive, but because she unable to perceive the exact 
boundary of it, the addition of more has no effect on her wellbeing.    
71 Lawsky, supra note 60, at 906.  
72 Id. at 929 (discussing the Friedman-Savage utility curve). 
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social stratum more than they value additional dollars that are 
inframarginal with regard to social stratum.73 Similarly, an 
entrepreneur at any level of income could have steady or increasing 
marginal utility for income if additional dollars are needed to 
undertake a highly valued project. For example, someone on the brink 
of building the first starship might have a concave utility curve for 
income as she approaches the level of capital needed to entice 
investors. Both stories—of the social striver and of the entrepreneur—
are believable in the case of a human, but neither is believable in the 
case of AI. Willingness to confiscatorily tax non-sentient feral AI, but 
not the alleged zero-marginal utility dollars of humans, demonstrates 
the role of humanity in welfarist thinking. 
 
Unease with confiscatory taxation of the marginal dollars of high 
earners also may reflect human-centric beliefs about the societal value 
of property rights, even when the individual holder values those rights 
at zero. The case for a confiscatory tax on feral AI (if such a tax were 
possible) is an easy one. By contrast, the case for a 100% tax on extra 
dollars of the ultra-wealthy “feels” wrong. The spidey sense that such 
a tax has to be rooted in a perceived intrinsic difference between the 
condition of being human and the condition of being non-human. For 
example, awareness of the taking itself may be a source of disutility 
for a sentient being but not for a non-sentient one, or perhaps the 
desirability of private ownership is so deeply ingrained for humans 
that it impossible to subjectively accept the idea of zero marginal 
utility.74 Furthermore, if earnings are reinvested by people but not by 
AI, the positive and negative externalities of that reinvestment must be 
considered. 
 
d. Non-Sentient AI and Optimal Tax Principles 
 
The conclusion that our hypothetical AI should be taxed at 100% but 
perhaps a person should not is further complicated if we assume that 
 
 
 
 
73 See id. at 937 (positing locally increasing marginal utility as an explanation for gambling). 
74 This observation still must incorporate sentience though. An AI that takes information from 
the commons and combines it with labor might be thought to have entitlement to the fruits of 
its labor according to Mill, subject of course to the prohibition on waste, which would apply if 
the AI is unable to redeploy its earnings.  
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our hypothetical non-sentient feral AI can dispose of its earned income 
in other productive transactions. In such a case, although the AI’s 
earnings do not increase its welfare (because it lacks the capacity for 
welfare), the AI’s deployment of them may affect the welfare of 
others.75      
 
To continue the thought experiment, assume that once the AI has 
earned income through a market transaction, it then deploys its 
earnings beneficially through capital investment, or microlending, or 
donation to charities. Or perhaps it deploys its earnings in a welfare-
destroying way by creating market distortions or, more dramatically, 
sponsoring hate speech, for example. The AI continues to have zero 
marginal utility in any of its earnings, but the question of whether to 
confiscatorily tax it is muddled by the societal effects of its 
redeployment of its earnings. Although it cannot experience utility, 
others might experience utility gains or losses from its deployment of 
earnings. If the goal of the government’s distribution of the tax burden 
is to maximize utility, it cannot simply aggregate the self-regarding 
utility functions of each earner with regard to each earner’s tax. 
Instead, it must recognize and somehow account for the downstream 
effect that taxing one earner might have on the utility of another 
earner. Government cognizance of economic interconnectedness might 
counsel against taxing the feral AI confiscatorily. Interconnectedness 
counsels taxing the AI only to the extent that the government’s use of 
the AI’s earnings will produce greater overall welfare (however it is 
defined) than the AI’s deployment of them. That the AI itself 
experiences neither utility nor disutility is beside the point. Instead, in 
a variation of the hypothetical where AI redeploys it earnings, a 
welfare-maximizing income tax rate must account for the positive and 
negative externalities of the AI’s aggregate activity. If the AI’s use is 
welfare-maximizing relative to the government’s use, a welfare-
optimizing tax will leave money in the hands of the AI. In such a case, 
we might think of the AI as a notional public trust of sorts. 
 
 
 
 
 
75 This assumption also removes the justification for taxation under the entitlement theory 
because the AI’s assets no longer could be viewed as Lockean waste.   
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In the example above, is feral AI analogous to a high net worth 
investor or entrepreneur? If so, the measurement of only self-regarding 
welfare gains or losses gives the government an incomplete picture by 
placing outsized weight on the preferences of the individual taxpayer. 
As with the benefit principle above, focusing on any given individual’s 
assessment of the value of either income or public goods injects an 
illogical human element into the calculus. In addition, with regard to 
tax on a single person, a focus on self-regarding welfare for 
computational purposes irrationally prefers the welfare effect on that 
person over the welfare effect on the remaining collective of people. 
Just as comparing utility created by AI’s deployment versus public 
deployment of resources should allow for greater welfare 
maximization, comparing the positive and negative externalities of 
people’s use of presumptively zero marginal utility earnings should do 
the same. Here, so long as we hold to the hypothetical of non-
sentience, humanity really may matter. For example, a human may 
have welfare gains from earnings because money buys power, yet that 
person’s purchase of power may create negative externalities for the 
collective.76 Alternatively, the would-be starship entrepreneur’s use of 
earnings may create not only welfare for the entrepreneur but also 
positive externalities for the collective. Focusing outwardly on the 
positive and negative externalities of earnings redeployment, rather 
than inwardly on the feelings of individual earners, should produce a 
more efficient and just distribution of resources overall and could 
enable a more rational, less emotionally-charged dialogue about high-
end taxation. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Conceptualizing the income tax in the context of a non-human, non-
sentient earner can reveal the ways in which our humanity has 
influenced tax theory and tax policy. Human-centric influence may not 
 
 
 
 
76 See Ari Glogower, supra note 68, at 1445 (considering for equity purposes the relative 
economic power theory, which provides that “excessively unequal distributions of economic 
resources and market power can result in unequal divisions of political and social power as 
well.”) Glogower adds, “from a welfarist perspective, the relative economic power theory may 
be understood to describe a general negative externality resulting from economic inequality.”  
Id. at 1451. 
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always lead to logical, welfare-maximizing outcomes, particularly for 
those who are dehumanized either in rhetoric or in practice, such as the 
very rich or the very poor. Substituting a hypothetical AI for human 
taxpayers allows us to think dispassionately about ways in which 
popular justifications for income taxation fail in both contexts, and the 
thought experiment raises a deep question about the role of individual 
preferences in crafting a just distribution of the tax burden. One lesson 
may be that the interconnectedness of individuals counsels the 
consideration of factors beyond individual preference and self-
regarding welfare, such as the positive and negative externalities of 
taxpayers’ use of their income and, as always, that most basic of tax 
policy building blocks, a person’s ability to pay. 
 
